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S

tates affected by landmines and
explosive remnants of war (ERW)
are faced with a number of diffi-

cult decisions when they establish their
mine action program, such as “how deep
should operators clear?” and “what tasks
should they do first?” The deliberations
and conclusions that ultimately are drawn
together in national standards are part of
an implicit or explicit risk management
approach. Over time, risk assessments re-

quire review and modification to reflect

Figure 1. Program life cycle for mine action: planning for long-term risk management.
All graphics courtesy of GICHD.

different contexts.
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States embark on proactive efforts to find mines and ERW

national context. For example, what are the determined clear-

that pose the greatest risk immediately after a conflict (typi-

ance depth and fade-out requirements, and the potential cost

cally aided by the international community). Thanks to the

of returning to areas and clearing low-density contamination

survey and clearance carried out in the proactive phase, risks

at a later date? Unless recontamination occurs, the commit-

gradually decline. The analysis of risk and the accompanying

ment of additional resources is considered unreasonable since

mine action response must therefore be carried out for various

the costs for logistics and support in clearing the site would

phases in a mine action program. The shorter-term proactive

be roughly doubled. These discussions will inevitably lead to a

phase will imply a heavier investment of targeted resources

review and evaluation of the relative cost of survey and clear-

to reduce the risk to acceptable levels, while long-term risk

ance, and the opportunity costs of resources that are, or can

management (LTRM) issues constitute the reactive phase and

be, made available.

should be mainstreamed into sustainable, nationally-owned

These issues need to be considered against appropriate

structures. This article describes the process of evaluating

strategic planning and risk management methodologies to

the probabilities and consequences of adverse events that de-

develop effective/efficient systems for addressing any remain-

termine long-term risk and the implications of effective risk

ing mine/ERW threat, from proactive survey and clearance

management for how mine action programs are structured

to reactive risk management strategy. National standards

and managed over time.2

and relevant treaty frameworks require every effort in clear-

Establishing country-specific roadmaps for transition from

ing the mine/ERW threat, but there are inevitably diminish-

proactive survey and clearance to a reactive phase is an impor-

ing returns in the investment costs of proactive survey and

tant process for each mine action program, as this should de-

clearance.3 The ratio of items found against land processed is

fine what the residual state will be. It is the prerogative of the

becoming an increasingly important indicator of effective-

national authority to establish what the residual or end state is

ness. Moreover, the cost of clearing areas where no mine/

while working with key stakeholders. The mine action sector

ERW threat is found must be justified more convincingly

has spent much time and energy in productively developing

than suggesting that community confidence building is a

and improving cost-efficient methodologies for land release

sufficient rationale to spend donor millions. The balance and

through survey and clearance of suspected and confirmed

tipping point between proactive survey and clearance and re-

hazardous areas (SHA/CHA). The most difficult element of

active risk management strategy is significant in the life cycle

these discussions involves the criteria for releasing land in a

of a program.
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that would accrue from the extra expenditure of time, resources, or money,
leaving the challenge of managing the
residual mine/ERW threat.
The

International

Mine

Action

Standards (IMAS) define residual risk as
“the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to identify, define and remove all presence and
suspicion of mines/ERW through nontechnical survey, technical survey and/
or clearance.”5 It is logical to understand
Figure 2. The As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) concept (after ISO 21010).

residual contamination as the sites or
areas where mines or ERW are discov-

Life Cycle of a Mine/ERW Program

ered following the application of all reasonable efforts to sur-

mines and ERW becomes less of an immediate emergency and

known SHAs and CHAs in a given locality.6

As a country or region recovers from conflict, clearing

vey/identify and then process (cancel, reduce, or clear) all

high priority, with reactive responses replacing proactive sur-

Reactive management of risks posed by residual contami-

vey and clearance program over varying timeframes. As time

nation requires a different approach to the one that was uti-

goes on, the United Nations, specialist NGOs, and commer-

lized during the proactive survey and clearance phase. This

cial operations terminate programs, and leave or hand over

requires a review of the established institutional architec-

assets to national ownership. All mine action/human secu-

ture, as well as the development of evidence-based systems,

rity programs operate within this continuum, represented in

tools, and processes. Whichever approach is adopted in each

Figure 1. The capacities to respond tend to be confined to a

country-specific scenario will rely on the information that is

few specialist military/police units, civil defense, fire service,

available to assess risk. Quantifying or predicting the known

and commercial service provision, the scale of which is de-

unknowns is problematic and a constraint on stating what

termined by the need of governments and/or market forces.

level of resource may be required to effectively address any re-

4

In countries approaching this transition, there are oppor-

sidual contamination.

tunities to apply principles of strategic planning and risk

It should be noted that risks are not only those that have

management to develop effective risk management systems

the potential to cause direct human harm, but may also in-

addressing any residual mines and ERW that are well adapted

clude those that can inf luence economic activity, freedom

to local circumstances and conditions.

of movement, and other aspects of importance to a society

A Risk Management Approach

and economy.

Reducing risk to a level as low as rea-

sonably practicable (ALARP) should apply to the management of residual mine/
ERW situations (see Figure 2). There are
risks that are generally accepted as being so low that no action is required,
and there are risks that are clearly
unacceptable. Between those two relatively straightforward categories lies a
range of risks and situations. ALARP,
and all reasonable effort (discussed later in the article) embody a concept that
additional survey and clearance cannot be justified in terms of the benefits

Figure 3. National mine action program.

ISSUE 21.3 @ NOVEMBER 2017

57

Figure 5. Risk matrix scoring of xy + y.

or unprecedented, where the rules are unknown or rapidly
changing, or where risks are driven by external factors beyond
their control.7 These risks, which have high impact and low
Figure 4. Real ERW risks.

likelihood of occurrence, are now accepted by many as having
greater importance than those with a high likelihood of oc-

A rigorous approach to responding to all mine/ERW risks

currence and an insignificant impact. In the case of residual

that affect the achievement of a country`s economic objectives

mines and ERW, the concept of impact and the likelihood of

could be one framework on which to base the management of

events occurring should be given prominence in risk assess-

residual mines and ERW. A risk management strategy embed-

ment and processes.8

ded in a national system would allow the potentially negative

The risk matrix in Figure 5 shows an approach to repre-

impact of residual mines and ERW to be mitigated effectively.

senting LTRM in a residual context by increasing the weight-

The objective of residual risk management is to fully under-

ing of the potential impact of an event against likelihood. This

stand the nature of the residual risks to which governments

works on a scoring of xy + y, where x is likelihood and y is

and communities are being exposed, and then implement sen-

impact (Figure 5). This formula multiplies impact with likeli-

sible, cost-effective measures to minimize the downside and

hood then adds a weighting again for impact. It should be re-

maximize the upside (Figure 3).

membered that the scoring of risk magnitude often involves a

The purpose of risk identification is to understand the real-

degree of judgement or subjectivity. Where data or informa-

ity of mine/ERW risks, as opposed to the perception of those

tion on past events or patterns is available, it will enable more

risks. The way in which mine/ERW risks are perceived by soci-

evidence-based risk judgements. In interpreting the risk ma-

ety and the general public is an important part of the context,

trix the color codes are:

but effective management of residual mines and ERW is based
upon identifying and understanding the reality of those risks.
Residual risks only exist when three associated factors combine: an explosive hazard must be present at a location where

*

Red represents major or extreme/catastrophic risks that

*

Amber represents moderate or major risks that score

an activity capable of interacting with the hazard is taking
place or will take place. In the risk diagram (Figure 4), a real
risk only arises in the central red zone of the diagram. All
three contributing factors need to be understood when identifying residual risks of mines and ERW, and that perception of
risk may extend outside the red zone.
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score 15 or more (ALARP: Unacceptable).
between 8 and 14 (ALARP: Tolerable only if risk reduction is impracticable, or if cost is grossly disproportionate

*

to improvement gained).
Blue represents minor or insignificant risks scoring 7 or
less (ALARP: Broadly acceptable region).9

When addressing large, air-dropped munitions, the probability/incidence rate and severe consequence of an accident

Specific countries or regions that moved from a proactive to

would support discussion of a greater weighting of impact

a reactive approach to mines and ERW should note the devel-

on the risk matrix to use a formula of xy + 2y (represented

opments made over recent years in approaches to represent-

in Figure 6). This will allow consideration of the fact that on

ing risk impact and likelihood. Many organizations outside

rare occasions improbable events do occur with devastating

mine action now take account of adverse events that are rare

effects. The weighting of impact brings almost half the risk
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construction, etc., a risk review/response will be needed before activity takes place. Therefore, communication and record keeping during the land release process
is crucial for the future management of residual risk. If the
survey and clearance data is absent or inconsistent, the residual risk management approach has less evidence on which to
base decisions.
This issue is illustrated using data from the LWCC Quang
Tri database in Vietnam. The contamination survey and clear-

Figure 6. Risk matrix scoring of xy + 2y.

ance map (Figure 7) was built using the survey and clearance

management framework results into the ALARP unaccept-

records from Cam Lo District, Vietnam. Each red dot indi-

able region, which is a strategic challenge for finding the

cated a mine or item of ERW located and cleared to the 30 cm

appropriate response to address residual contamination, par-

(11.8 in) national survey and clearance depth.

ticularly for residual large, air-dropped munitions.

This returns the land to communities in Cam Lo to safe

Locating UXO on a construction site in the United Kingdom

use for current activity and agricultural practices—a com-

is considered by the Construction Industry Research and

pliant residual state. Any change in land use at a later date,

Information Association (CIRIA), as a “high consequence but

illustrated in Figure 8, will introduce the residual risk-

low probability event.”10 CIRIA recommends that “appropri-

management questions relating to items potentially located be-

ate allowance should be made at the design stage for assess-

low the Vietnam national standard 30 cm (11.8 in) threshold.

ing the risk of encountering UXO on-site and for mitigating

The discussions on residual management led to revisiting

that risk if significant,” suggesting that factors such as public

the question of what the sector means by safe following survey

safety, on-site safety, neighboring buildings, secondary haz-

and clearance to national standards (when based on IMAS).

ards, and the safe excavation and disposal of UXO targets are

The standard clearance depths differ from country to coun-

considerations in developing an investigation methodolo-

try; e.g., for cluster munition remnants: Cambodia’s is 20 cm

gy.10 A version of this approach should be applied in countries

(7.9 in), Lao’s is 25 cm (9.8 in), Vietnam’s is 30 cm (11.8 in).

that reach a residual mine/ERW management state, partic-

This represents the national authority agreement, described in

ularly where large, air-dropped munitions were a feature of

the national standards, on the required risk mitigation to an

the conflict.

acceptable level in order to hand back land to communities

Evidence-based Risk Management

free from immediate threat.
Responsible authorities and mine action operators always

A key area of focus for LTRM must be on the integrity of

ensure that survey and clearance are completed comprehen-

survey and clearance data, and how that can be used to in-

sively, and record the location, items, and depth, guarantee-

form risk management decision making once the proactive

ing that everything is documented for a defined handover to

survey and clearance activity has
ceased.11 Future decision making will
benefit from access to comprehensive
data on survey and clearance. The
risk management issue of clearance
depth relates directly to land use. If
the land is for current agricultural
use in countries such as Cambodia,
Laos, and Vietnam, then the national standard survey and clearance depth does mitigate the threat
to communities. If land use in specific areas changes through infrastructure development, urbanization,

Figure 7. Contamination survey and clearance map of Cam Lo District, Vietnam.
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the recognized authority. This activity delivers a specific, defined record of
the safe land to allow communities and
others to manage future developments.
Inconsistencies in recording data and
in data management remain ongoing
challenges for evidence-based LTRM.

Summary

The sector needs to continue asking

“what needs to be done now to ensure
that an effective risk management response can be delivered in the future?”
It is important to be able to support
evidence-based, risk management decision making with comprehensive
data sets on survey and clearance (type
of target, location, depth). It is also important to note that the answer to
“what is safe?" will change over time as
land use changes. Procedures should
be adapted in a residual mine/ERW
management phase to accommodate
this, as has already been demonstrated
in post-conflict scenarios in Europe
addressing UXO from World War I
and II, and in current and concluding
mine action programs, particularly
when related to infrastructure development and construction. There are

Figure 8. Land-use change.

key challenges, specific to each country
that must be overcome. These include the decision on when to
move from proactive survey and clearance to a reactive risk
management strategy response, and what constitutes every effort, all reasonable effort, or ALARP to meet treaty obligations
and compliance. A risk management strategy is required to
understand residual risk on areas released through non-technical survey, technical survey, and clearance. The different
contexts found in programs that are geographically and sociopolitically diverse will dictate resource management, capacity
development, and sustainable choices on relevant tools and
approaches, supporting risk management strategies to react
cost effectively to a residual mine/ERW threat.
See endnotes page 67
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